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INTRODUCTION 
“Cams on cops.” The terse three-word slogan, painted in green  
lettering on a homemade poster, held by a protester on a Seattle,  
Washington, street corner, deftly encapsulated a tidal shift in policing 
well underway in cities near and far.1 In fact, across the state in Airway 
Heights, a town in Spokane County with a population one-hundredth the 
size of Seattle’s,2 patrol officers had been filming with body-worn  
cameras since 2009.3 The cameras, Airway Heights Police Chief Lee 
Bennett had said, “were on sale.”4 And the cameras’ footage proved to be 
unbiased and useful, he told an Eastern Washington media outlet.5 His 
department, staffed with twenty-some officers, refers to video footage as 
“the third witness.”6 
By 2014, a “third witness” for overseeing police and civilian  
interactions—not only in Washington State, but in states across the  
nation—was in popular demand.7 The year spawned massive citizen  
protests; people started to organize in record numbers on streets, in 
community centers, in churches, and in virtual spaces like Tumblr,  
Facebook, and Twitter8 to thrust into the national spotlight a widespread 
disquiet over police shootings of unarmed racial minorities.9 The name at 
the forefront of the movement belonged to Michael Brown, a black 
eighteen-year-old who was shot and killed in 2014 by Darren Wilson, a 
                                                     
*J.D. Candidate 2017. Special thanks to the editing team of Seattle University Law Review. 
 1. Ansel Herz, Why the ACLU of Washington Opposes the State Proposal on Body Cameras, 
STRANGER: SLOG (Apr. 14, 2015, 11:51 AM), http://www.thestranger.com/blogs/slog/ 
2015/04/14/22050526/why-the-aclu-of-washington-opposes-the-state-proposal-on-body-cameras 
[https://perma.cc/W3X3-FDXG]. 
 2. Recent estimates put Seattle’s population at 684,451 residents and Airway Heights’s at 
6,639 residents. QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/ 
53/5300905.html?cssp=SERP [https://perma.cc/K64P-UJUC]. 
 3. See Erik Loney, Spokane Law Enforcement Want Third Eye, KXLY  
(Feb. 25, 2011, 4:17 AM), http://www.kxly.com/news/Spokane-Law-Enforcement-Want-Third-
Eye/682376 [https://perma.cc/UY3T-QYC3]. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. JAY STANLEY, ACLU, POLICE BODY-MOUNTED CAMERAS: WITH RIGHT POLICIES IN PLACE, 
A WIN FOR ALL, VERSION 2.0 1–2 (2015), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/ 
police_body-mounted_cameras-v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/W64R-EEDG] (finding that police  
body-worn cameras arose to address the “growing recognition that the United States has a real  
problem with police violence”). 
 8. Rubina Madan Fillion, How Ferguson Protestors Use Social Media to Organize, WALL 
STREET J.: DISPATCH (Nov. 24, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/dispatch/2014/11/24/how-ferguson-
protesters-use-social-media-to-.organize/. 
 9. See Larry Buchanan et al., What Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-under-siege-after-
police-shooting.html?_r=0 (last updated Aug. 10, 2015). 
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white police officer.10 A grand jury’s decision not to indict Wilson for 
Brown’s death ignited civilian clashes with police in Brown’s home city 
of Ferguson, Missouri, so severe that windows shattered, buildings 
blazed, tear gas sprayed, and rubber bullets flew.11 County officials  
declared a state of emergency.12 
The problem: a perception of officers using force—sometimes 
deadly force—in unreasonable contexts and in racially motivated ways.13 
The solution: more oversight of the police by civilians.14 The  
means: body-worn cameras—clip-on devices, usually smaller than a 
deck of cards, attached to an officer’s eyewear or uniform lapel15—that 
would allow officers to capture their encounters with the public on video. 
Cameras on cops: it was the pragmatic solution that many cities 
chose.16 Body-worn camera programs were designed to encourage  
officers to follow department policies, to deter excessive use of force, to 
exonerate officers from unsupported claims of misconduct and  
groundless citizen complaints, to gather better evidence at crime scenes 
and, perhaps most importantly, to make everyday policing practices 
transparent in the wake of soured relationships between the force and the 
community.17 
The idea took hold across the country.18 From Damascus, Virginia, 
a town with a population hovering at about 800 residents19 and four  
full-time police officers,20 to New York City,21 cities moved swiftly to 
adopt body-worn camera pilot programs. 
                                                     
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See The Harvard Law Review Ass’n, Development in the Law Policing: Chapter Four 
Considering Police Body Cameras, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1794, 1794–95 (2015) [hereinafter Consider-
ing Police Body Cameras]. 
 14. See id. 
 15. STANLEY, supra note 7, at 1. 
 16. See infra text accompanying notes 18–21. 
 17. Bryce Clayton Newell, Collateral Visibility: Police Body Cameras, Public Discourse, and 
Privacy 61 (2016–17) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Indiana Law Journal). 
 18. LINDSAY MILLER, JESSICA TOLIVER & POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, 
IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM: RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 
1–2 (2014) [hereinafter MILLER]. 
 19. See Damascus, VA Profile: Facts, Map & Data, VA HOMETOWNLOCATOR  
(July 1, 2015), http://virginia.hometownlocator.com/va/washington/damascus.cfm [https://perma.cc/ 
8FDY-UVR7]. 
 20. Kevin Johnson, Lack of Training, Standards Mean Big Problems for Small Police  
Departments, USA TODAY (June 23, 2015, 4:39 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ 
nation/2015/06/23/small-police-departments-standards-training/28823849/ [https://perma.cc/B6JN-
BA5U]. 
 21. MARC JONATHAN BLITZ, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW & POLICY, POLICE  
BODY-WORN CAMERAS: EVIDENTIARY BENEFITS AND PRIVACY THREATS 3–4 (May 2015). 
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Cameras on cops: whether the policy was a solution, a preventative 
measure, or a new trend already underway in policing, it was the move 
that 25% of the nation’s 17,000 police agencies chose in the last few 
years and an option that 80% are currently considering or testing.22 The 
Department of Justice loudly endorsed the programs by supplying more 
than $23.2 million in funding to seventy-three local and tribal agencies in 
thirty-two states with the aim of “expand[ing] the use of body-worn 
cameras and explor[ing] their impact.”23 Some lawmakers even favored 
body-worn cameras enough to make them mandatory; in June 2015, 
South Carolina became the first state to require all law enforcement  
departments to implement body-worn camera programs.24 
But, does privacy shrink as accountability grows? Some experts 
worry that body-worn cameras will infringe on the unique safeguards 
that states, including Washington, have built into their legal frameworks 
to protect privacy.25 Take, for example, Technology and Liberty Director 
for the ACLU of Washington, Jared Friend, who voiced the fear that 
body-worn cameras could “ultimately amount to thousands of roaming 
surveillance cameras that will . . . capture all kinds of sensitive  
interactions.”26 
As departments pilot and implement body-worn cameras programs, 
researchers and scholars have raised concerns over protecting both the 
privacy of people who find themselves subjects of body-worn camera 
footage and the rights of citizens to obtain videos under state public  
record acts.27 A spike of state legislation28 has begun to respond to these 
                                                     
 22. STANLEY, supra note 7, at 1. 
 23. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department Awards 
over $23 Million in Funding for Body Worn Camera Pilot Program to Support Law Enforcement 
Agencies in 32 States, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE (Sept. 21, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-awards-over-23-million-funding-body-worn-
camera-pilot-program-support-law [https://perma.cc/9KKZ-6692]. 
 24. Rich Williams, South Carolina First State to Require Body-Worn Police Cameras, NAT’L 
CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (June 10, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/blog/2015/06/10/south-carolina-
first-state-to-require-body-worn-police-cameras.aspx [https://perma.cc/8E9G-F9H3]. 
 25. In Washington, these privacy safeguards rest on Article I, Section 7 of the  
state constitution. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 26. Herz, supra note 1. 
 27. Police departments are hardly deaf to these concerns. Interestingly, Timothy Clemans, the 
civilian who brought this issue to the forefront in Seattle by making a public records request for 
every video the police had recorded with a body camera, was hired by the police department to help 
it deal with the massive amount of video data they had begun to accumulate. See Mark Harris, The 
Body Cam Hacker Who Schooled the Police, BACKCHANNEL (May 22, 2015), 
https://medium.com/backchannel/the-body-cam-hacker-who-schooled-the-policec046ff7f6f13#. 
t38q9fei8 [https://perma.cc/95LU-ARGD]. 
 28. Thirty-four states, as of May 2015, are considering new laws regulating body-worn  
cameras. Law Enforcement Overview, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (May 29, 2015), 
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concerns. Bills, including one signed into law on April 1, 2016, in  
Washington State, set guidelines limiting the disclosure of some sensitive 
or offensive footage to protect the identities of civilians filmed in homes, 
hospitals, and other intimate settings.29 
However other questions linger. Should officers review videos—
perhaps stopping, slowing, or zooming in on images—when preparing to 
testify for the State at criminal proceedings? Can police departments use 
images from body-worn cameras to create criminal profiles?30 Friend’s 
question—“Are [police] allowed to use the data they’ve collected for 
other purposes?”—crystalizes this general uneasiness.31 
This Note contributes to a growing body of work that weighs the 
gains that communities stand to make from police body-worn cameras 
against the tangle of concerns about how cameras may infringe on  
individual liberties and tread on existing privacy laws. While police  
departments have quickly implemented cameras over the past few years, 
laws governing the use of the footage body-worn cameras capture still 
trail behind.32 Notably, admissibility rules for footage from an officer’s 
camera, and evidence obtained with the help of that footage, remain on 
the horizon.33 
This Note focuses exclusively on Washington State’s laws.34 It 
takes a clinical approach by addressing two areas in which body-worn 
cameras as a government evidence-gathering tool may clash with privacy 
laws in Washington: the state’s plain view doctrine and the Washington 
State Privacy Act. 
This Note argues that courts should restrict evidence from  
body-worn cameras when that evidence defies the boundaries of the plain 
view doctrine or when it captures a protected conversation under the  
Privacy Act. Part I discusses the background in which body-worn  
                                                                                                                       
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/law-enforcement.aspx [https://perma.cc/ 
T8DM-TFWM].  
 29. H.B. 2362, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2016). 
 30. See Rachel La Corte, Washington Senate Passes Bill on Police Body Cameras, SEATTLE 
TIMES (Mar. 4, 2016, 8:02 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/washington-senate-
passes-bill-on-police-body-cameras/ [https://perma.cc/J4WX-VRK6]. 
 31. Sydney Brownstone, The Seattle Police Department is Pondering What to Do with Body 
Cam Data, STRANGER: SLOG (June 24, 2015, 1:53 PM), http://www.thestranger.com/blogs/slog/ 
2015/06/24/22445782/seattle-police-department-is-considering-predictive-policing [https://perma.cc/ 
7857-N59F]. 
 32. MILLER, supra note 18, at 2. 
 33. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, LEGAL ISSUES SURROUNDING THE USE OF BODY 
CAMERAS, 1, 8 (2015) [hereinafter LEGAL ISSUES]. 
 34. The use of body-worn cameras has the potential to brush up against the privacy laws of a 
number of states. However, the scope of this Note is limited to Washington’ laws to provide a  
focused example of how evidence-gathering with body cameras might come into conflict with one 
state’s legal framework. 
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cameras gained popularity, specifically unpacking their role in the 
 community policing model; it then outlines Washington’s hesitancy to 
embrace law enforcement’s strides to enhance its evidence-gathering 
abilities through technology. Part II discusses the problems in  
determining whether footage obtained in the course of an officer’s duties 
is admissible under the plain view doctrine. Part III examines the  
potential for cameras to capture the audio of conversations that the  
Privacy Act protects. Part IV argues that trial courts should be cognizant 
of the strong potential for body-worn camera footage and audio to  
influence juries; it advocates for courts to play a gatekeeping role and 
suppress evidence derived from body-worn cameras (1) when such  
evidence fails to meet the requirements of a plain view seizure or (2) 
when it contains a conversation recorded in violation of the Privacy Act. 
I. POLICE BODY-WORN CAMERAS AS BOTH A REMEDY AND A LOGICAL 
NEXT STEP; WASHINGTON AS A PROTECTOR OF PRIVACY 
The use of police body-worn cameras arose both in response to  
civilian misgivings of police displays of force and as a logical step to 
further the goals of information gathering in community policing.  
However, Washington’s laws—both state supreme court decisions and 
legislative mandates underscoring the state’s commitment to  
safeguarding privacy—erect a resistance to law enforcement drawing 
from new technology to augment its evidence-gathering capabilities. 
A. Body-Worn Cameras: Information-Gathering Instruments to Further 
Community Policing Goals 
Some have observed that police departments’ body-worn camera 
programs unveil a new era of police oversight.35 This era, some scholars 
suggest, is marked by a growing schism between the police and the  
citizenry.36 The narrative is one that a textbook written years into the  
future might recount as follows, police shootings and inordinate displays 
of force demanded increased transparency from police officers; cities and 
police departments responded by self-monitoring with body-worn  
cameras.37 Yet, the story is hardly so simple. 
                                                     
 35. Elise Hu, Using Technology to Counter Police Mistrust is Complicated, NPR  
(Sept. 2, 2014, 12:10 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2014/09/02/345208359/ 
using-technology-to-counter-police-mistrust-is-complicated [https://perma.cc/38RZ-EZMZ]. 
 36. STANLEY, supra note 7, at 2. See generally Barak Ariel, Tony Farrar & Alex Sutherland, 
The Effect of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Use of Force and Citizens’ Complaints Against the 
Police: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 31 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 509, 509 (2015). 
 37. See Considering Police Body Cameras, supra note 13, at 1794. 
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Some police departments, including Seattle’s, point out that they 
started to consider cameras before the protests following the death of 
Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri.38 Moreover, police officers and 
their supervisors largely welcomed body-worn camera programs.39 And 
for good cause—one of the first comprehensive studies unpacking the 
effects of body-worn cameras, conducted in Rialto, California, found that 
civilian complaints against officers dropped by 88% after officers started 
wearing cameras.40 Police department supervisors and officers cite other 
benefits of the cameras, namely that they preserve evidence that could—
and often does—evaporate before trial.41 Carlos Ramirez, a California 
police officer, highlighted that “[b]y the time [domestic violence] cases 
get to court often things have cooled down and the victim retracts. But 
with the video you see her with the bloody lip. There’s nothing lost in 
translation.”42 
Body-worn cameras might have been a natural and predictable next 
step to improve upon the model of community policing that started to 
take hold in the second half of the twentieth century.43 A 1998  
newsletter, cosponsored by Harvard Law School and the Department of 
Justice, describes some of the key features of community policing: 
[These features include] information gathering, victim counseling 
and services, community organizing and consultation, education, 
walk-and-ride and knock-on-door programs, as well as regular  
patrol, specialized forms of patrol, and rapid response to emergency 
calls for service. Emphasis is placed on information sharing  
between patrol and detectives to increase the possibility of crime  
solution and clearance.44 
                                                     
 38. SPD Answers Your Questions on Body Cameras, SPD BLOTTER (Dec. 12, 2014, 6:33 PM), 
http://spdblotter.seattle.gov/2014/12/12/spd-answers-your-questions-on-body-cameras/ 
[https://perma.cc/CET9-5QYB] [hereinafter SPD Answers Your Questions]. Arguably, for a number 
of years independent pressures had weighed on Seattle to adopt a comprehensive police oversight 
program because the department had entered into a consent decree with the Department of Justice in 
December 2011. See The Seattle Consent Decree: How It Came About, What It Is, and What the 
Monitor Does, SEATTLE POLICE MONITOR, http://www.seattlemonitor.com/overview/ 
[https://perma.cc/8V3E-S3TR]. 
 39. Rory Carroll, California Police Use of Body Cameras Cuts Violence and Complaints, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2013 12:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/04/california-
police-body-cameras-cuts-violence-complaints-rialto [https://perma.cc/M4HB-VJB9]. 
 40. Ariel, Farrar & Sutherland, supra note 36, at 524. 
 41. Carroll, supra note 39. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, UNDERSTANDING COMMUNITY POLICING: A 
FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION 1, 5–7 (Aug. 1994). 
 44. George L. Kelling & Mark H. Moore, The Evolving Strategy of Policing, 4 PERSP. ON 
POLICING 1, 12–13 (Nov. 1998), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/114213.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/28TM-A7Y6]. 
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This characterization of community policing focuses on  
information gathering.45 Successful community policing—even nearly 
twenty years ago as it was understood then by the newsletter’s authors—
hinged, in large part, on the police obtaining information from the people 
who resided in the areas they served. To do so, officers were to talk to 
citizens and create partnerships with business, church, and community 
leaders.46 They were to spend time on the city blocks that made up their 
beat, to have their eyes and ears on the street, and to have a more  
continuous presence in the community than they ever had before.47  
Police departments started to recognize that more local information from 
the community—including information from informants about the  
identities of criminals and hotspots for crime—served them well in  
locating criminal activity.48 
When police record a crime, the film often captures evidence. The 
film preserves a record from which prosecutors and defense attorneys 
can craft arguments in court. Video from a body-worn camera furnishes 
more life and color than even a carefully detailed, written police report.49 
It provides a better record than an officer trying to recall at trial what 
evidence he uncovered at a crime scene weeks or months before.50 Thus, 
body-worn cameras not only rose in popularity to ensure police and  
citizens both remained on their best behavior,51 but also because filming 
is a way to gather information and to collect useful evidence. 
B. Washington’s Restrictions on New Evidence-Gathering Tools 
Washington, however, has not always welcomed technological  
advances in evidence-gathering. . In the face of wiretapping,52 the global  
positioning system,53 and thermal imaging,54 Washington’s legislature 
and courts have announced limitations on new technology-based tools, 
sometimes years ahead of federal rules. This trend aligns with the robust 
                                                     
 45. Id. 
 46. See generally id. 
 47. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 43, at 21–22. 
 48. Id. at 9–10. 
 49. Newell, supra note 17, at 12–13 (citing TONY MCNULTY & PATRICIA SCOTLAND, POLICE 
AND CRIME STANDARDS DIRECTORATE, Foreword to MARTIN GOODALL, POLICE & CRIME 
STANDARDS DIRECTORATE, GUIDANCE FOR THE POLICE USE OF BODY-WORN VIDEO DEVICES 5 
(2007)). 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Carroll, supra note 39. 
 52. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030 (1986); 1986 Wash. Sess. Laws 160–61. 
 53. State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 224 (Wash. 2003) (holding that the installation of a GPS 
tracker on a vehicle is a search and typically requires a warrant). 
 54. State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 598 (Wash. 1994) (holding that thermal imaging of a home 
was a search and that this warrantless use of technology violated Washington’s state constitution). 
2016] Recording a New Frontier in Evidence-Gathering 279 
privacy protections engendered in Article I, Section 7 of the constitution 
of the State of Washington, which extend beyond those contained in the 
federal Constitution.55 Section 7 provides: “No person shall be disturbed 
in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”56 
Washington courts have held this language, unlike the Fourth  
Amendment, provides sweeping privacy protections and “no express  
limitations” on a Washington State resident’s privacy interest.57 Other 
state courts agree that Washington’s constitution engenders a broader 
recognition of individual privacy rights than most state constitutions.58 
Washington, therefore, provides a particularly interesting context in 
which to examine the intersection of police body-worn cameras as  
evidence-gathering tools with privacy protections in state law. 
II. A PLAIN VIEW OF EVIDENCE OR A PLAIN RECORD OF EVIDENCE? 
Washington, like all states,59 follows the plain view doctrine.60 
Generally, police officers cannot search constitutionally protected areas, 
or areas in which people enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy,  
without a search warrant.61 Warrants do not authorize a general search of 
an area; rather, they must be specific.62 Warrants must describe with  
particularity the location to be searched and the items officers intend to 
discover63 in order to “eliminate[] the danger of unlimited discretion in 
the executing officer’s determination of what to seize.”64 
The plain view doctrine, however, is an exception to the warrant  
requirement that gives some discretion back to officers. It authorizes  
police to lawfully seize evidence they plainly perceive65 without a  
warrant in a constitutionally protected area so long as two requirements 
are satisfied. First, officers must have a prior justification for an intrusion 
                                                     
 55. State v. Valdez, 224 P.3d 751, 756–57 (Wash. 2009); see also State v. Arreola, 290 P.3d 
983, 988 (Wash. 2012) (noting that Article I, Section 7 of Washington’s constitution is “grounded in 
a broad right to privacy and the need for legal authorization in order to disturb that right”). 
 56. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 57. State v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927, 930 (Wash. 1998). 
 58. See Hageman v. Goshen Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 256 P.3d 487, 494 (Wyo. 2011)  
(discussing how Washington, unlike other states, elected to make the requirement of a warrant  
essential to determining the constitutionality of the search). 
 59. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136 (1990) (holding that evidence obtained under the 
plain view doctrine does not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
 60. State v. Ruem, 313 P.3d 1156, 1160 (Wash. 2013). 
 61. Id. 
 62. State v. Perrone, 834 P.2d 611, 614 (Wash. 1992). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 615. 
 65. The plain view doctrine is not limited in application to evidence officers see; it also applies 
to evidence that officers touch. See State v. Hudson, 874 P.2d 160, 166 (Wash. 1994). 
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into the protected area.66 Second, the evidence’s incriminating nature 
must be immediately apparent.67 If the government fails to establish that 
both of these requirements were met, the evidence is tainted and courts 
will exclude it in a subsequent criminal proceeding.68 
Footage from an officer’s body-worn camera is problematic in light 
of both of the plain view doctrine’s requirements. First, body-worn  
cameras can record images of evidence in a protected location where an 
officer lacks a prior justification for being. Second, body-worn cameras 
may record images of evidence which officers do not perceive as  
incriminating at the time, but later, upon reviewing a segment of footage, 
identify as evidence of a crime. 
A. Filming Without a Lawful Presence? Footage Captured in  
Constitutionally Protected Contexts 
Evidence derived from body-worn police cameras becomes  
problematic upon considering the doctrine’s initial requirement that an 
officer have a prior justification, or lawful reason, for being in the area in 
which the officer uncovers evidence in plain view.69 Washington, like 
most states, requires that police meet this “lawful presence” requirement 
as a threshold condition before determining whether evidence was 
properly seized.70 If an officer collects physical evidence from a  
protected area without prior authorization—for example, if the officer 
gathers the plain view evidence in the course of an illegal search—the 
evidence is the fruit of an unlawful seizure and will not be admissible at 
a subsequent criminal trial.71 
Generally, a search warrant provides an officer with a prior  
justification to enter and search a protected area.72 An officer may also 
have a prior justification for being in a protected area when exigent  
circumstances require the officer to enter, when the officer has consent to 
                                                     
 66. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 128 (1990) (explaining that the federal plain view 
doctrine no longer requires that officers who seize evidence in plain view also meet a third  
requirement, that the evidence be discovered inadvertently). While Washington cases before Horton 
recognized the inadvertency requirement, Washington’s supreme court and appellate courts  
now consistently follow Horton and recognize only the two elements of the plain view doctrine 
Horton sets out—that officers have a prior justification and the evidence holds immediately  
incriminating nature. See Ruem, 313 P.3d at 1160; State v. O’Neill, 62 P.3d 489, 500 (Wash. 2003); 
State v. Ring, 364 P.3d 853, 857 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015). 
 67. See Horton, 496 U.S. at 128. 
 68. Ruem, 313 P.3d at 1164. 
 69. State v. Hatchie, 166 P.3d 698, 702 (Wash. 2007). 
 70. Id.; see also Ruem, 313 P.3d at 1160. 
 71. Ruem, 313 P.3d at 1165 (holding that information gathered in plain view will not support a 
subsequent search warrant based on that information if it was obtained while an officer was  
unlawfully present at a home). 
 72. See State v. Garvin, 207 P.3d 1266, 1270 (Wash. 2009). 
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enter, or when the officer is performing a search incident to a valid  
arrest.73 When officers lack search warrants to enter a protected area, the 
rules surrounding the lawfulness of their presence also often hinge on the 
reasonable expectation of privacy a person enjoys in the protected 
space—the justifications for an inspection of a vehicle for suspected  
illicit materials is distinct from those authorizing an officer to enter a 
bedroom to look for concealed contraband.74 
The home is one locale where Washington residents enjoy a  
substantial expectation of privacy.75 Thus, a home search offers an  
illustration of how an officer might gather “plain view” evidence without 
a prior justification.76 Unlike the majority of states, Washington requires 
that officers conducting a “knock and talk”77 at a residence inform the 
occupants that they have the right to deny the officer’s request to search 
the home.78 Further, officers must inform the occupants that they “can 
revoke, at any time, the consent that they give, and can limit the scope of 
the consent to certain areas of the home.”79 This stringent informed  
consent standard prevents officers from seizing evidence in plain view at 
a residence after consent to search the home is withdrawn.80 
In State v. Ruem, for example, the court held officers unlawfully 
continued a search when, despite smelling burnt marijuana and seeing 
marijuana starter plants in plain view, they continued to remain in a  
mobile home after the resident of the home revoked consent for the  
officers to be present.81 Although the court found the initial entry into 
                                                     
 73. Id. 
 74. Compare State v. Tyler, 302 P.3d 165, 174 (Wash. 2013) (holding that consent is not a 
requirement for an inventory search of an impounded vehicle after a driver has been taken into  
custody), with State v. Kull, 118 P.3d 307, 311 (Wash. 2005) (holding that the government’s failure 
to show consent or a concern for officer safety rendered a warrantless search of a woman’s bedroom 
unlawful and that evidence in plain view seized in the course of the search should have been  
suppressed). 
 75. See State v. Ross, 4 P.3d 130, 135 (Wash. 2000). 
 76. Id. 
 77. A “knock and talk” occurs when police approach a home without probable cause of  
criminal activity and request consent to search the home. MARK L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: THE POLICE 218 (5th ed. 2015) (discussing a majority of states’ rule that 
officers do not always need to inform residents they can refrain from consenting to a police officer’s 
request to search their homes). 
 78. See State v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927, 934 (Wash. 1998). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See, e.g., State v. Ruem, 313 P.3d 1156, 1165 (Wash. 2013). 
 81. Id. at 1164. Ruem was decided prior to the approval of Washington’s Initiative 502, which 
removed criminal penalties for recreational use of marijuana by people twenty-one years old or 
older. Fact Sheet: Initiative 502’s Impact on the Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board, 
WASH. ST. LIQUOR & CANNABIS BOARD, http://www.liq.wa.gov/mj2015/fact-sheet 
[https://perma.cc/3F9P-GHSL]. 
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defendant Ruem’s home lawful,82 the officers exceeded the scope of their 
consent when they continued to search the premises once Ruem told 
them, “This is not a good time.”83 Thus, the evidence officers uncovered 
in plain view was compromised because their prior justification for being 
at Ruem’s residence vanished when he withdrew consent.84 
The plain view doctrine’s “prior justification” requirement and 
body-worn cameras also clash outside the context of a “knock and talk” 
at a home. In State v. Ring, a Washington appellate court held that an 
officer’s plain view discovery of a an aluminum can with  
white powdered residue, which he immediately recognized as  
methamphetamine, was unlawful because a portion of the search warrant 
was overbroad and, therefore, invalid.85 The appellate court reversed the 
defendant’s conviction of possession of a controlled substance86 because 
the trial court committed prejudicial error in admitting evidence of the 
trash can under the plain view doctrine.87 
The use of body-worn cameras in situations underlying cases such 
as Ruem and Ring blurs the line between evidence that officers obtain 
legally and that which they may collect without the authority of law. In 
the context of a “knock and talk,” body-worn cameras will assist in  
documenting an indisputable record of an officer issuing—or failing to 
issue—a warning to home residents of their rights to refuse consent to a 
search. But at the doorway and inside, the cameras can also record a 
wide range of other objects, people, and activities in the home.  
Furthermore, during a search, cameras will capture images of any space 
an officer moves through, regardless of whether a court later determines 
the officer should not have entered that location. Because cameras are 
generally mounted on an officer’s glasses, hat, or lapel,88 officers lack 
complete control of everything the camera catches. While an officer 
might record images of evidence listed in a warrant, her camera is likely 
to capture more. 
This becomes particularly problematic in cases like Ring, in which 
the court noticed the officer who searched the shipping container was 
                                                     
 82. In this case, while officers did not give Ferrier warnings, the court determined their entry 
was still lawful because Ruem voluntarily consented, and the officer’s purpose in entering the  
mobile home was to look for another suspect, not to search the home. Ruem, 313 P.3d at 1163. 
 83. Id. at 1164. 
 84. Id. at 1163–64. 
 85. State v. Ring, 364 P.3d 853, 857 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (explaining that although portions 
of the officers’ warrant were valid, the overbroad, invalid portions could not be severed from the 
valid portions, thus the entire search was rendered unlawful). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. GREG HURLEY, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, BODY WORN CAMERAS AND THE COURTS 
1, 3 (2016). 
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“not aware of the purpose of the warrant, and could not remember  
exactly what the deputies were searching for.”89 Not only will an officer 
with a body-worn camera in this context leave with the memory of  
evidence he saw, he will leave with footage corroborating it. 
A recording from the scene of a search—or another lawful  
intrusion—may match the officer’s memory of objects or contraband the 
officer noticed. Yet, it may also offer a broader, clearer, or more  
convincing picture of what lay beyond an area the law authorized an  
officer to enter. Notably, in Ruem, the court made it clear that it was  
improper for the officers to base a warrant request on their plain view 
observation of the marijuana plants in the home because they made this 
observation in an unjustified context—after Ruem had revoked consent 
by telling officers it was not a good time for them to be in his mobile 
home.90 Yet will officers be able to base warrant requests on video  
footage they obtain in constitutionally protected areas they lacked a  
justification for entering? This question, as well as the question of 
whether video footage may properly be admitted as stand-alone  
evidence, however, has yet to be addressed by the Washington  
Supreme Court.91 
B. Immediately Incriminating or Immediately Incriminating  
Upon a Second Look? 
The plain view doctrine’s second requirement appears, at first 
blush, less entangled with privacy concerns than its first: evidence must 
hold an immediately incriminating nature at the time it is seized.92 The 
second requirement serves a straightforward normative idea: police 
should generally only gather evidence specific that their search warrants 
predicts.93 They should not enjoy free reign in executing a warrant94 to 
gather evidence of other crimes or “extend a general exploratory search 
from one object to another until something incriminating at last  
                                                     
 89. Ring, 364 P.3d at 857. 
 90. State v. Ruem, 313 P.3d 1156, 1164 (Wash. 2013). 
 91. LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 33, at 8. 
 92. State v. Hatchie, 166 P.3d 698, 702 (Wash. 2007). 
 93. See, e.g., State v. Perrone, 834 P.2d 611, 614–15 (Wash. 1992) (“[T]he purposes of the 
search warrant particularity requirement are the prevention of general searches, prevention of the 
seizure of objects on the mistaken assumption that they fall within the issuing magistrate’s  
authorization, and prevention of the issuance of warrants on loose, vague, or doubtful bases of 
fact.”). 
 94. Officers can lawfully make privacy intrusions into protected areas without warrants under 
exigent circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 120 P.3d 635, 640–41 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005)  
(holding that an officer could lawfully pull over a vehicle registered to a person listed as  
“missing/endangered” in a government database for the sole purpose of determining whether the 
missing person was in the car). 
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emerges.”95 When officers unpredictably encounter evidence that blatant-
ly suggests criminal activity, however, it contravenes common sense that 
they ought to ignore it.96 Evidence that falls into this category is limited 
to objects that will lead to an arrest or display a “sufficient nexus with 
the crime under investigation.”97 Washington’s plain view doctrine also 
encompasses “plain touch,” “plain smell,” and “plain hearing.”98 
Generally, Washington courts have held the “immediately  
apparent” requirement means officers must instantly recognize that what 
they see (or touch or smell or hear) is contraband or evidence of a 
crime.99 If officers make this determination, they may seize the  
evidence.100 Washington law does not demand officers know with  
unflinching certainty that an object or substance before them bears a  
relation to a crime but does require that, “considering the surrounding 
facts and circumstances, the police can reasonably conclude they have 
evidence before them.”101 An officer’s experience also matters: 
knowledge an officer gains though prior narcotics investigations, for  
example, is relevant in determining whether it was reasonable for the 
officer to assume a substance is an illegal drug.102 
The “immediately apparent requirement” prevents officers in the 
field from gathering objects they encounter in the course of a lawful 
search if they need to further investigate them before deciphering their 
incriminating characteristics. In State v. Murray, for example, officers 
seized evidence unrelated to the theft they were investigating—in this 
case, a television set that police observed in plain view during an  
otherwise lawful search of an apartment.103 The court held this evidence 
was tainted.104 Even though the police had a warrant to search the  
apartment for evidence, they “did not know the television set was  
incriminating until after the serial numbers had been checked with police 
headquarters.”105 Put simply, the law does not vest in police the  
                                                     
 95. State v. Murray, 527 P.2d 1303, 1307 (Wash. 1974) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971)). 
 96. Id. 
 97. State v. Terrovona, 716 P.2d 295, 303 (Wash. 1986). 
98. State v. Lair, 630 P.2d 427, 433 (Wash. 1981). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See State v. Kennedy, 726 P.2d 445, 449 (Wash. 1986) (holding that, based on knowledge 
the officer had gained through officer’s prior narcotics investigations, he could have reasonably 
concluded that a baggie he seized contained drugs). 
 103. State v. Murray, 527 P.2d 1303, 1307 (Wash. 1974). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. (emphasis added). 
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discretion to seize first and decipher a piece of evidence’s incriminating 
nature later. 
Law enforcement filming with body-worn cameras in Washington 
will likely encounter plain view evidence that is unequivocally  
incriminating in the course of many lawful searches or other situations in 
which they have a lawful prior justification for being in a given area.106  
Evidence of this class might include illegal guns or knives, drugs in 
powder or pill form and relevant paraphernalia, or child pornography. 
Other objects captured on film, however, might not readily display an 
overt, incriminating nature. 
Take, for example, a package concealed in, but bulging underneath, 
a suspect’s pants or jacket pocket. Upon squeezing the pocket in the 
course of a lawful pat-down for weapons,107 suppose the officer feels 
what he determines to be a small baggie containing a powder or  
crystalline substance—something that he does not know for sure, but 
suspects to be contraband given his experience.108 Do these  
circumstances furnish enough of an indication that the bulge holds an 
incriminating character? Can the officer seize the contents in the  
suspect’s pocket based on his plain-feel discovery? 
In State v. Garvin, the Washington Supreme Court was faced with a 
situation akin to the one described above but decided the case on other 
grounds.109 The facts in Garvin, however, reveal how footage from a 
body-worn camera could augment what otherwise might be only  
marginal suspicion of an object’s incriminating nature from an officer’s 
touch, which would not be enough to seize the object.110 
Similarly, the sight of an object that looks suspicious is not always 
enough for the officer to seize the item under the plain view doctrine.111 
For example, in State v. Cotten, FBI agents discovered a shotgun  
protruding from the defendant’s bedcovers while they searched his room 
                                                     
 106. Given the number of cities currently implementing or piloting police body-worn camera 
programs in Washington, many officers have likely already made records of such evidence.  
See supra Part I. 
 107. A pat-down, or “Terry search,” refers to a constitutionally permissible limited search of a 
suspect’s outer clothing which an officer is justified in conducting when he has a reasonable  
articulable suspicion the suspect has weapons on his person that could harm the officer or others. See 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968). 
 108. The facts of this hypothetical are closely based on the facts of State v. Garvin, 207 P.3d 
1266, 1268–69 (Wash. 2009). 
 109. Garvin, 207 P.3d at 1272–73 (reversing the defendant’s conviction on the grounds that the 
scope of the officer’s pat-down was unreasonable and holding that the evidence should have been 
suppressed once the officer determined the bulge he felt in the pocket was not a weapon). 
 110. State v. Hudson, 874 P.2d 160, 166 (Wash. 1994) (holding that an officer must  
immediately recognize the incriminating nature of evidence he touches). 
 111. State v. Cotten, 879 P.2d 971, 979 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994). 
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for evidence in a bombing investigation.112 The court held the plain view 
doctrine did not justify the FBI’s seizure of the gun because the agents 
lacked knowledge of the suspect’s involvement in a shooting.113 The gun, 
therefore, lacked an “immediately apparent” incriminating nature.114 
Police department manuals, including Seattle’s, however, provide 
that officers may review footage previously recorded by body-worn 
cameras in a limited number of situations.115 One of these situations is in 
preparation for criminal investigations.116 Most of the state’s police  
departments, including Seattle’s, have not yet specified the amount of 
time or the level of thoroughness an officer may or should allot for  
reviewing a previously recorded incident that led to an arrest.117  
Similarly, policies lack answers regarding whether police officers can or 
ought to watch previously filmed footage in slow motion, enhance the 
images on the film, rewind and watch a particular scene unfold again, or 
stop the film at points to take notes or examine a particular shot in detail. 
To be sure, footage from body-worn cameras serves the interest of 
justice in a significant way; it preserves a clear record of images and 
sounds that an officer can use in preparation for a subsequent  
fact-finding proceeding. Allowing officers to return to a film before  
testifying at trial provides officers an avenue to refresh their memories of 
an incident and proffer more accurate testimony at a criminal  
proceeding.118 
However, could video that does arrive at the courtroom confer on 
testifying officers a disproportionate advantage? Recent scholarship on 
body-worn cameras unveils the concern that the officer—not the  
individual subject to a stop, search, seizure, or arrest—influences how a 
                                                     
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. The court in Cotten explained that, because the officers were conducting a search of a 
suspect’s bedroom (in his mother’s home with his mother’s consent), the officers had authority to 
briefly seize dangerous weapons they encountered, so removing bullets from the gun or “otherwise 
rendering the weapon temporarily unusable,” as well as keeping the gun with the officers was  
lawful. Id. at 980. The seizure, however, could not be justified under the plain view doctrine. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T, SEATTLE POLICE MANUAL DIRECTIVE NO. 14-00062, NEW 
MANUAL SECTION: 16.091 – BODY-WORN VIDEO PILOT PROGRAM, Pt. 16.091-POL-2, ¶ 2  
(Dec. 20, 2015), http://spdblotter.seattle.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/12_17_14-Policy.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N4JD-YZHJ]. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See id. 
 118. In fact, some reports underscore the concern that given the volume of body-worn camera 
videos, footage favorable to defendants might slip through the cracks. HURLEY, supra note 88, at 7. 
Given the amount of video that will amass, as well as the uploading, sorting, and cataloguing police 
departments must undertake, “there will inevitably be cases in which video that was taken and  
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video is created.119 An officer cannot alter film after recording it,120 yet 
the officer still determines, at least to a notable degree, what ends up in a 
video and what gets left out. The officer does not control every image he 
captures with his camera, but still has more control than the subject of 
the film to make a record of incriminating evidence against that subject. 
The camera is not pointed on the officer, nor does it capture all of his 
relevant demeanor and body language. Similarly, officers will not point 
their cameras at unimportant, collateral scenes, people, or objects. In the 
course of a search, officers are likely to make a record—likely in good 
faith—of that which looked suspect to them, not that which looked  
innocent and benign. 
As Washington courts have noted in evaluating the reasonableness 
of police making observations in the course of their work, an officer “is 
trained to observe to a higher degree than the average citizen.”121 The 
preparation that law enforcement agents undergo to effectively  
investigate crimes, including training to perceive what ordinary civilians 
might miss, situates police officers in a position to return from a search 
with video footage that strongly aligns with their suspicions of a given 
area or person. 
An officer reviewing a film in preparation for trial will  
likely be able to uncover more factual support for the conclusion that an 
object or substance holds a set of characteristics that rendered it  
“immediately incriminating”—especially if further independent  
investigation or a suspect’s confession confirms that the object was  
indeed related to criminal activity. Returning to the facts of Garvin, had 
the officers used cameras to record the encounter, the video could have 
easily captured an image defining the contours of the bulge in the  
defendant’s pocket and corroborated the officer’s suspicion that the 
pocket held a baggie containing contraband. The video could have also 
captured the way the defendant might have been trying to conceal the 
contents of his pocket with his hand movements, clothing, or stance.122 
Similarly, body-worn camera footage of the shotgun seized in Cotton 
could have augmented the State’s argument that the weapon displayed an 
immediately incriminating character. 
                                                     
 119. Considering Police Body Cameras, supra note 13, at 1805–07. 
 120. To prevent deletion or editing of a video, Seattle has used a system of “hash tags” to  
encrypt a video so it cannot be altered after it is uploaded to the department’s cloud storage system. 
SPD Answers Your Questions, supra note 38. 
 121. State v. Graffius, 871 P.2d 1115, 1119 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994). 
 122. It is important to note here that cameras can also surely provide a record that is  
exculpatory to suspects who are the subject of the film. The aim of this Note is to explore how police 
officer body-worn cameras might reify or make more convincing evidence in the record already 
obtained by law enforcement. 
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Revisiting a film allows the government to retroactively justify a 
prior determination that a seized object held an immediately  
incriminating character. This erodes the limits on the plain view doctrine. 
As the court explained more than forty years ago in State v. Murray, the 
first Washington case to chart the doctrine’s boundaries, the plain view 
exception to the warrant requirement was not intended to give officers 
broad evidence-gathering privileges.123 Rather, the plain view exception 
grew out of the common sense notion that law enforcement agents 
should not turn a blind eye to dangerous or significant evidence of  
criminal activity in front of them while they lawfully execute their  
duties.124 The problem with footage from body-worn cameras is that the 
evidence returns to being, for all relevant purposes, “in front of” the  
officer again if he later examines it—it furnishes another opportunity for 
an object’s incriminating nature to readily appear. 
III. PICKING UP PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS: AUDIO RECORDINGS FROM 
BODY-WORN CAMERAS THAT VIOLATE WASHINGTON’S PRIVACY ACT 
A. Officer–Civilian Conversations: Is a Fair Warning Required? 
A second problem surrounding evidence-gathering capacities of  
police body-worn cameras arises upon examining Washington’s Privacy 
Act.125 The Washington Supreme Court resolved some questions about 
the legality of officers recording audio of their conversations with  
civilians in Lewis v. State Department of Licensing.126 In Lewis, the court 
held that conversations between a civilian and a police officer executing 
his official duties at a traffic stop are not private.127 However, the court in 
Lewis interpreted the Privacy Act to “tip[] the balance in favor of  
individual privacy at the expense of law enforcement’s ability to gather 
evidence without a warrant.”128 The court specifically examined 
RCW 9.73.090(1)(c), the portion of the Privacy Act that governs sound 
recordings that correspond to video images recorded by cameras  
mounted on dashboards of law enforcement patrol vehicles, or  
“dash-cams.” RCW 9.73.090(1)(c) provides in relevant part, 
[a] law enforcement officer shall inform any person being recorded 
by sound under this subsection (1)(c) that a sound recording is being 
made and the statement so informing the person shall be included in 
                                                     
 123. See State v. Murray, 527 P.2d 1303, 1307 (Wash. 1974). 
 124. Id. 
 125. See State v. Kipp, 317 P.3d 1029, 1032 (Wash. 2014). 
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the sound recording, except that the law enforcement officer is not 
required to inform the person being recorded if the person is being 
recorded under exigent circumstances. A law enforcement officer is 
not required to inform a person being recorded by video under this 
subsection (1)(c) that the person is being recorded by video.129 
The court held the statute’s plain language mandated the officers, 
who recorded audio of their conversations with the defendants from their 
dash-cams, to inform drivers that they were recording and make a record 
of the warning on the recording.130 Because the officers failed to issue 
this warning, the court concluded that the trial court should have  
suppressed the evidence of the conversations at the traffic stop.131 
Lewis suggests officers filming with body-worn cameras, like  
officers filming with dash-cams, should also be required to inform  
civilians they encounter that their camera’s microphones are turned on—
otherwise, the capture will be unlawful. Notably, the Seattle Police  
Department took no risks in its pilot program with twelve officers from 
the city’s East Precinct; the department required the officers to give a 
verbal warning to anyone they filmed.132 The Washington State  
Legislature, however, has yet to extend the requirements for dashboard 
cameras contained in RCW 9.73.090(1)(c) to police body-worn  
cameras.133 
B. Conversations Between Civilians: Picking up Private Conversations 
The Privacy Act’s “all-party consent rule” is a distinctive privacy 
safeguard; only eleven states codify it in their laws.134 Generally, the rule 
shelters private conversations from law enforcement’s reach; it provides 
that unless all parties to a private conversation give consent, the state135 
may not record their conversation.136 The Act first distinguishes between 
private and public conversations; it armors the former with full-bodied 
safeguards and confers none on the latter.137 
                                                     
 129. WASH REV. CODE § 9.73.090(1)(c) (2011). 
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 132. SPD Answers Your Questions, supra note 38. 
 133. LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 33, at 3. 
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Because courts have not concluded an officer’s conversation with a 
civilian is “public” under the Act,138 an officer is not required to obtain 
the consent of a civilian before recording their exchange with a  
body-worn camera. In turn, the Act does not require a civilian to obtain 
consent of an officer prior to recording an oral exchange with that officer 
with a cellular phone or any other electronic device.139 It is of no  
consequence who holds the camera or tape recorder, who presses record, 
and who halts the recording. In neither case is the recording of audio  
during a pure civilian-to-officer encounter unlawful so long as at least 
one party consents.140 
Private conversations are different.141 Washington courts prefer a 
plain definition of the word and employ a two-step test to determine 
whether a conversation is private: First, the participants in the  
conversation must manifest a subjective intent that the conversation be 
private.142 Second, that expectation of privacy must be reasonable.143 To 
make these two determinations, Washington courts consider several  
factors, including the “(1) duration and subject matter of the  
conversation, (2) location of conversation and presence or potential  
presence of a third party, and (3) role of the nonconsenting party and his 
or her relationship to the consenting party.”144 When a conversation is 
private, the Act prohibits recording it by any electronic device unless all 
parties to the conversation first give consent to be recorded.145 
The all-party consent rule presents problems for officers recording 
with body-worn cameras in the field. A 2014 Washington Attorney  
General Opinion explained that while an officer recording audio with a 
body-worn camera as he talks to a person on the street does not trigger 
any requirement that the officer obtain that person’s consent, “a court 
could conclude that some intercepted conversations in a person’s home 
involving parties other than police officers might be private and not  
subject to lawful recording.”146 
Accordingly, if an officer lawfully enters a home where only one 
person is present—because, for example, he has a search warrant or valid 
consent for the entry—recording a conversation between the officer and 
that person without the individual’s consent does not present a problem 
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because a pure officer-to-civilian conversation is public and not  
protected.147 However, an officer who lawfully enters a home where 
more than one person is present and records a conversation between two 
or more people with his body-worn camera might violate the Act. 
Problems involving parties “other than police officers” mushroom 
in cohousing units with multiple residents; apartment buildings with 
communal and frequented lobbies, hallways, and rooftops; and college 
dormitories with a number of shared rooms and common study spaces. It 
would be both burdensome and inefficient to require officers in the field 
to turn off their body-worn camera’s microphones every time they  
encountered two or more people engaging in a conversation that  
appeared to be private.148 Equally unreasonable would be for officers to 
always approach two or more individuals speaking to each other, ask 
them if they intended to keep their conversation private, and then request 
their consent to record the remainder of their conversation if they  
responded in the affirmative. 
A near inevitability exists that officers will inadvertently record 
some private conversations with body-worn cameras. For this reason, 
some police departments—cognizant of the all-party consent rule—tread 
carefully. In Seattle, for example, the department’s manual governing the 
city’s body-worn camera program provides: 
For residences or other private areas not open to the public, officers 
will ask for consent to record with B[ody] W[orn] V[ideo]. The  
request and any response will be recorded. If the request is denied, 
officers will stop recording with BWV during the time that they are 
in the private area.149 
The question remains though, does the consent of one person  
answering the door function as a valid authorization for an officer to  
record the communications of others inside? Some police department 
policies150 and draft policies151 on body-worn cameras require officers to 
inform civilians they are being recorded, but do not contain express  
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revised-draft-11-01-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/HMC8-KEHT]. 
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language regarding consent. Situations in which a private area holds 
many occupants will present challenges for officers to adequately obtain 
valid consent from every speaker. 
Recent court decisions hint that police body-worn cameras’  
recordings of private civilian-to-civilian conversations will be suppressed 
in criminal proceedings, but provide no definitive answer. In State v. 
Kipp, for example, the court held the secret recording of a conversation 
between a defendant and his brother-in-law violated the Privacy Act.152 
Reversing the trial court, the Washington Supreme Court held that the 
conversation, which centered on the accusation that Kipp had molested 
two of his nieces, was private under the Act because (1) the defendant, 
speaking to his brother-in-law in an upstairs kitchen, a room occupied by 
only one other person who was exiting, manifested his intent to keep his 
conversation confidential, and (2) this expectation of privacy was  
reasonable given the conversation occurred in a home, lasted over ten 
minutes, and broached grave topics.153 
The court concluded that because the brother-in-law recorded the 
conversation in violation of the Privacy Act,154 the trial court should have 
suppressed the audio recording of the conversation at the subsequent 
criminal proceeding.155 Kipp provides a foundation for an argument that 
audio recordings made of private conversations through a police officer’s 
body-worn camera are equally tainted evidence and should also be  
suppressed. If the subjects of the recording, like the defendant in Kipp, 
freely speak to one another, unaware that a body-worn camera is  
recording their voices, it is unlikely that the recording of this  
conversation could be used against them in court, particularly if they are 
speaking in a context where the circumstances point to a reasonable  
expectation of privacy. They might, for example, be conversing behind a 
closed bedroom door or out of sight, but not earshot, of an officer filming 
elsewhere in the home. 
Questions about how to apply Kipp, however, still linger. What if 
two or more people know their private conversation might have been 
recorded—because, for example, they see an officer wearing a camera—
but do not realize they ever had a right to withhold consent to an audio 
recording of their voices? Should courts also suppress these  
conversations?156 
                                                     
 152. State v. Kipp, 317 P.3d 1029, 1034 (Wash. 2014). 
 153. Id. 
 154. The brother-in-law turned the recording over to law enforcement to be used in  
investigation and for protection. Id. at 1031. 
 155. Id. at 1037. 
 156. In the context of the home, Washington case law suggests the answer may be yes. See 
State v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927, 934 (Wash. 1998) (holding that, in the context of the home, the  
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Furthermore, an officer might unintentionally record a private  
conversation. Both the officer and the civilian parties might be unaware 
that the conversation has been captured until after the officer is  
dispatched to another call, returns to the station, or ends a shift.  
Washington courts note that overhearing incriminating conversations or 
other auditory evidence of a crime in a place where the officer has a legal 
right to be does not require the officer to plug his ears.157 In these  
situations, the inadvertent recording of the communication—either  
because the officer did not realize the conversation was private or realize 
his camera was recording—might also be suppressed. Assuming the  
officer acted in good faith and did not, like the law enforcement agents in 
Kipp, attempt to secretly harvest confidential information, however, the 
State might have a strong argument that the conversations should be  
admitted in a criminal proceeding. 
Still, concerns regarding random and widespread  
“oversurveilling”158 remain. Notably, the Privacy Act does not require 
that a recording be made knowingly for it to violate the all-party consent 
rule.159 Good faith might not be enough. 
IV. THE COURT AS REFEREE OF EVIDENCE AND PROTECTOR  
OF THE JURY’S FUNCTION 
Trial courts and juries will be the first to the wrestle with evidence 
from body-worn cameras in criminal trials. Accordingly, Washington 
trial court judges should assume the responsibility of gatekeepers and 
exclude evidence derived from body-worn cameras when it arises in a 
context that unreasonably stretches the boundaries of the plain view  
doctrine or when it defies the Privacy Act’s all-party consent rule. 
A. Perspective Matters: The Jury’s Role as Fact Finder in the Wake of 
Body-Worn Camera Footage 
In considering the potential for body-worn cameras to generate a 
large body of evidence, it is important to recognize that the cameras  
benefit not only the government—using this evidence to investigate and 
prosecute crimes—but to criminal defendants as well. Videos create a 
                                                                                                                       
waiver of a defendant’s rights must be the product of an informed decision). Because Ferrier  
addressed a constitutional right—to require production of a warrant—courts may not extend  
Ferrier’s rule to a violation of a statutory right under the Privacy Act. 
 157. State v. Ruem, 313 P.3d 1156, 1168 (Wash. 2013) (Johnson, J., concurring in part,  
dissenting in part) (using the illustrative hypothetical of an officer unexpectedly hearing the crying 
of a kidnapped infant). 
 158. La Corte, supra note 30. 
 159. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030(1)(b) (1986). 
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clear record of events for juries.160 They deliver more verifiable evidence 
than eyewitness testimony, which is often presented months after an  
arrest.161 
Video evidence has the potential to both exonerate defendants who 
are factually innocent and incriminate guilty actors who otherwise would 
go free. These benefits should not be ignored. The ironic problem that 
arises from videos capturing arrests, or events leading up to arrests,  
however, is that they might be too trustworthy. The “third witness” that 
Airway Heights Police Chief Lee Bennett describes could win an  
inordinate amount of favor with juries.162 A video in the courtroom—
whether it be body-worn camera footage, a civilian’s cell phone video of 
a street corner arrest, surveillance footage, or an officer’s in-car video 
recording of a traffic stop—holds sway with jurors.163 
Seth W. Stoughton, a former police officer and a professor at  
the University of South Carolina School of Law, produced a series of 
videos that highlight how the position and angle of a camera informs the 
way people interpret video of police–civilian interactions.164 One video, 
filmed from an officer’s camera mounted on his chest, depicts a foot  
pursuit ending with both the civilian and the officer on the ground. The 
picture is jerky, the frame bounces frantically, and the images cut left and 
right.165 The officer yells, “He is reaching for my gun!”166 A second  
video shows the same foot pursuit, this time without the officer’s  
shouting; it is filmed by a bystander with a cellular phone, standing a few 
yards away.167 In the first video, 85% of viewers concluded the civilian 
never reached for the officer’s gun.168 In the second video, however 10% 
more viewers reported they did not see the suspect reach for the officer’s 
gun.169 
Another video shows an officer’s body-worn camera capture an  
interaction with a civilian at close range—again, the video bounces  
rapidly and the viewer only catches shaky glimpses of the civilian’s 
                                                     
 160. See MILLER, supra note 18, at 9. 
 161. Not forgotten are the original reasons cities wanted body-worn cameras on officers in the 
first place: to contribute to a body of documentation to either prove or disprove claims of police 
misconduct. Courts often rely on videos from vehicle-mounted cameras of police encounters with 
civilians in evaluating excessive force claims. See supra INTRODUCTION. 
 162. See Loney, supra note 3. 
 163. See Considering Police Body Cameras, supra note 13, at 1812–14. 
 164. Timothy Williams, James Thomas, Samuel Jacoby & Damien Cave, Police Body  
Cameras: What Do You See?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/04/01/us/police-bodycam-video.html?_r=0. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
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arms, torso, and face.170 No weapon is visible. In this video, 32% of 
80,000 viewers thought the officer faced a “very threatening”  
situation.171 A following video, filmed from a distance, reveals the  
officer and the civilian were dancing to fast-paced music, not fighting.172 
Jurors are tasked with assessing the weight and credibility of all evidence 
presented in court, including videos. Different videos of the same event, 
however, like the ones Stoughton produced can provide variable  
narratives. Given the ability of a video and its audio to inform ideas 
about an encounter between a police officer and a suspect, courts should  
scrutinize evidence arising from body-worn video with special care in 
pretrial proceedings. 
The Washington legislature will likely ultimately craft the rules  
surrounding permissible investigative use and the admissibility of film 
and audio from body-worn cameras. Washington recently passed a bill 
aimed at protecting privacy and preventing “voyeurism or exploitation” 
of footage from body-worn cameras by limiting disclosure of footage 
under the Public Records Act.173 This bill does not, however, reconcile 
the problems that arise considering body-worn camera evidence in light 
of the plain view doctrine and the Privacy Act.174 Legislative action takes 
time.175 In the interim, judges ought to safeguard the jury’s fact-finding 
province. Trial court judges hold great discretion to admit or suppress 
evidence,176 and appellate courts hesitate to overturn their decisions when 
they act within this discretion.177 Trial courts are, therefore,  
particularly well-positioned to preserve a jurisprudence that distinguishes 
Washington as protector of its residents’ privacy178 in the face of massive 
amounts of new evidence from police body-worn cameras. 
                                                     
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. The largest number of viewers (45%) reported they were “somewhat confident” in 
their answers. Id. Notably, most of the viewers who did not perceive a “very threating” situation still 
thought the encounter posed at least some threat to the officer in the video; they responded that the 
situation was either “somewhat,” or “a little” threatening. Id. Only 7% of viewers responded that the 
situation was “not threatening.” Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. H.B. 2362, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2016). 
 174. See id. 
 175. At least three bills before House Bill 2362 died in the Washington State legislature. See 
Derrick Nunnally, Police Body-Camera Bill Stirs Debate Over Privacy, Power, SEATTLE TIMES 
(Feb. 25, 2015, 7:23 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/police-body-camera-
bill-stirs-debate-over-privacy-power/ [https://perma.cc/LP86-WFRK]. Although House Bill 2362 
provides a comprehensive framework for departments to craft policies regarding the retention and 
release of videos, it does not address any specific rules for reconciling audio from body-worn  
cameras with the Privacy Act’s all-party consent rule. See H.B. 2362. 
 176. State v. Brown, 940 P.2d 546, 569 (Wash. 1997). 
 177. Id. 
 178. State v. Kipp, 317 P.3d 1029, 1032 (Wash. 2014) (noting that the Privacy Act’s all-party 
consent rule, for example, provides more protection than either the federal or the state constitution). 
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B. Judges as Umpires: Excluding Evidence that Exceeds the Bounds of 
the Plain View Doctrine and the Privacy Act 
Courts can resolve, or at least mitigate, the first problem with  
body-worn cameras and the plain view doctrine—the potential for  
officers to record evidence in a location in which they (intentionally or 
not) unlawfully intrude—by continuing to apply the plain view doctrine 
as they have for roughly the past forty years.179 Courts should suppress 
footage obtained in plain view when the officer was unlawfully present 
in the location where the officer seized it. This means that in a case like 
Ruem, had there been a video depicting marijuana plants in the  
defendant’s home, the video should have been excluded. Because Ruem 
revoked his consent to officers being on his property, their presence  
became unlawful before they viewed the plants.180 Accordingly, any  
video from a body-worn camera depicting the plants would have also 
been filmed in an unlawful context. 
Second, courts should not permit a video to substitute for an  
officer’s personal account that she knew the evidence seized in plain 
view held an incriminating nature at the time she seized it. If a court  
admits video evidence depicting a plain view seizure made in the course 
of a lawful search, the video should be accompanied by testimony from 
the police officer whose body-worn camera recorded it or from another 
officer qualified to authenticate the video.181 Film and audio that meets 
other evidentiary requirements for admissibility182 should still be  
admitted under the plain view doctrine. In this case, the defendant should 
be able to cross-examine the officer regarding the content of the video 
and the officer’s recollection of whether the evidence held immediately 
incriminating characteristics at the time of the seizure. 
Furthermore, rules from Lewis and Kipp should extend to audio  
recordings that officers make with body-worn cameras. The protections 
that apply to dashboard cameras, which require an officer to inform a 
motorist that she is being recorded, should also apply to body-worn  
                                                     
 179. See generally State v. Murray, 527 P.2d 1303, 1307 (Wash. 1974) (recognizing the plain 
view doctrine for the first time in the Washington Supreme Court). 
 180. State v. Ruem, 313 P.3d 1156, 1164 (Wash. 2013). 
 181. LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 33, at 8. If footage is admitted at trial, the government should 
also demonstrate that the chain of custody from the original video to the video presented at trial has 
remained uncompromised. The state, or the defendant (if the proponent of the video), should offer 
foundation testimony from technicians to describe the functionality of a given camera and the  
processes through which the film is uploaded, stored, and retrieved. Id. 
 182. Footage will also be subject to ordinary state rules of evidence and constitutional  
provisions—which means it may be suppressed on other grounds. For example, audio footage may 
contain testimonial hearsay that courts should exclude if the defendant lacks an opportunity to  
confront the speaker in the video through cross-examination. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 
813, 822 (2006). 
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cameras. More troublesome are audio recordings of the defendant’s  
private conversations, like the conversation in Kipp, which officers  
illegally obtained in violation of the all-party consent rule. These private 
conversations could be stand-alone evidence183 or they might lead  
officers to evidence of further criminal activity.184 Private conversations 
captured on a body-worn camera’s audio recording should not be  
harvested for use in prosecution. Courts should suppress recordings of  
private conversations. 
Finally, courts should not condone law enforcement using evidence 
recorded on a body-worn camera to further their investigations when it 
defies the limits of the plain view doctrine or contravenes the Privacy 
Act’s protections. This requires judges to deny requests for search  
warrants when probable cause rests only on (1) an unlawfully recorded 
private conversation, (2) visual recordings made in a location where an 
officer lacked a prior justification for being, (3) or a recording that  
captures evidence an officer did not immediately recognize as  
incriminating. This does not mean that if an officer has inadvertently 
recorded evidence illegally, that law enforcement cannot obtain probable 
cause through independent sources of evidence.185 It only means courts 
should not permit law enforcement to base warrant applications on film 
or audio evidence created in impermissible contexts. 
The aim here is not necessarily to reduce the number of videos that 
juries view. Nor is it to eliminate body-worn camera videos as materials 
an officer may review so that they can offer the most accurate testimony 
possible at trial. Neither is it meant to entirely thwart the potential for 
body-worn cameras’ recordings to be useful tools in investigation.  
Rather, the goal of these recommendations centers on protecting against 
footage and audio that blurs the common sense boundaries of the plain 
view doctrine and chips away at the buffer of privacy the legislature  
constructed with the Privacy Act’s all-party consent rule. 
CONCLUSION 
Whether law enforcement’s body-worn camera programs mark a 
novel reshaping of policing practices in the United States or merely  
                                                     
 183. As in Kipp, it could be an admission of a defendant’s criminal activities. State v. Kipp, 
317 P.3d 1029, 1031 (Wash. 2014). 
 184. A private conversation of this nature could, for example, contain statements regarding the 
location of the fruits of a crime or name other witnesses or victims. 
 185. State v. Gaines, 116 P.3d 993, 996 (Wash. 2005) (recognizing the “independent source 
doctrine” in Washington, which provides “evidence tainted by unlawful governmental action is not 
subject to suppression under the exclusionary rule, provided that it ultimately is obtained pursuant to 
a valid warrant or other lawful means independent of the unlawful action”). 
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signal a revamping of community policing with the help of new  
technology, they will certainly have an impact on the evidence-gathering 
abilities of officers. They have and will continue to act as independent, 
but perhaps not entirely unbiased, “third witnesses.” In turn, they have 
the potential to collide with some of Washington’s existing privacy  
protections. 
This Note has catalogued the difficulty in situating evidence  
obtained through the use of police body cameras in the framework of 
Washington State’s plain view doctrine and the Privacy Act’s all-party 
consent rule. First, under the plain view doctrine, questions will likely 
arise regarding whether footage was obtained while an officer enjoyed a 
prior justification for an intrusion of privacy or whether the intrusion 
lacked the authority of law. Courts will also likely encounter challenging 
questions of whether evidence catalogued on videotape had a nature so 
incriminating that it was “immediately apparent” at the time it was seized 
or whether it merely held a suspicious character that was later rational-
ized as incriminating. Second, officers with body-worn cameras—
intentionally or unwittingly—may record a private conversation under 
the Privacy Act without the consent of all participants. This Note argues 
that in certain situations, this audio and video evidence should be  
excluded. 
The legislature may craft admissibility rules and a more  
comprehensive framework in which to place footage from body-worn 
cameras, but uncertainty remains. This Note urges trial courts to act as 
gatekeepers in the interim. Courts should strictly apply the requirements 
of the plain view doctrine and the Privacy Act. In doing so, trial courts 
should reconcile the quickly emerging technological advances growing 
increasingly common in our society with the underlying robust principals 
of privacy that have distinguished Washington in its restriction of new 
technology-based law enforcement tools. While the law often lags behind 
technological advances, we should not dismiss our criminal justice  
system as incapable of fairly situating new evidence-gathering tools 
within its existing privacy framework. 
